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ARTICLE 
A STATE’S OBLIGATION TO FUND HORMONAL 
THERAPY AND SEX-REASSIGNMENT SURGERY FOR 
PRISONERS DIAGNOSED WITH GENDER IDENTITY 
DISORDER 
Rena Lindevaldsen† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For the first time in United States history, on September 4, 2012, a 
federal judge ordered a state to provide male-to-female sex-reassignment 
surgery to a prison inmate with gender identity disorder (“GID”). Patients 
with GID suffer psychological distress, including depression, thoughts of 
suicide, and the desire to amputate sex organs, because their perception of 
reality is different than actual reality—namely, they believe their gender is 
different than their biological sex. For many GID patients, they are certain 
that their psychological distress will be alleviated if they can become the sex 
they believe they should be through the use of cross-gender hormones, 
cross-dressing, and, for some, sex-reassignment surgery. In the situation of 
prisoners with GID, the question becomes whether the state must provide 
the desired hormones or sex-reassignment surgery. 
Although the United States Supreme Court has concluded that a state has 
an obligation to provide prisoners with medical care that meets minimal 
standards of adequacy, a prisoner establishes an Eighth Amendment 
violation only when state officials are deliberately indifferent to serious 
medical needs. This article explores whether a state law imposing a flat ban 
on the use of funds to provide cross-gender hormones or sex-reassignment 
surgery for prisoners diagnosed with GID satisfies the Eighth Amendment 
standard of deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs. In other 
words, the issue is whether it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for 
a state to refuse to provide hormones or sex-reassignment surgery to GID 
prisoners. The district court in Kosilek v. Spencer1 held that it does: the state 
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 1. Kosilek v. Spencer, No. 00-12455-MLW, 2012 WL 3799660 (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 2012). 
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violated the Eighth Amendment in providing feminizing hormones to 
Kosilek but refusing to provide him sex-reassignment surgery.2 
Part I of this article lays out a state’s obligation to provide medical 
treatment to its prisoners consistent with the Supreme Court’s current 
Eighth Amendment precedent.3 Part II discusses issues unique to a state’s 
determination of proper treatment for GID prisoners. Those issues 
primarily focus on the conflicting views in the medical community on the 
proper treatment of GID patients. Part III highlights several recent court 
decisions that exemplify the conflicts discussed in Part II, including whether 
a state’s obligation differs with respect to GID prisoners who commenced 
hormonal treatment before entering the prison system and those who were 
diagnosed with GID while in prison. Part IV asserts that a state acts 
consistently with its Eighth Amendment obligations when it prohibits the 
use of any funds for hormonal therapy or sex-reassignment surgery of GID 
prisoners. The proper course of treatment for GID should be to treat the 
underlying causes of the psychological distress, not to alter the prisoner’s 
physical characteristics to match the gender the prisoner believes he should 
be. 
II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITION AGAINST  
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
A.  The Supreme Court Has Decided That the Eighth Amendment Prohibits 
More Conduct Than That Prohibited by Our Founders. 
The text of the Eighth Amendment provides that “cruel and unusual 
punishments” shall not be “inflicted.”4 Since early in the twentieth century, 
the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the notion that the Eighth 
Amendment is to be interpreted according to the standards that prevailed 
when the Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791 . . . .5 Instead, the 
Supreme Court has tested the constitutionality of criminal punishments—
primarily the death penalty—by asking whether the imposed punishment 
comports with “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
                                                                                                                                          
 2. Id. at *53. 
 3. For purposes of this article, the author is analyzing the Eighth Amendment claim as 
if the Supreme Court has properly determined that the prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment has evolved, and will continue to do so, from the meaning given to the 
Amendment by the founders. This author, however, shares the views of Justices Thomas and 
Scalia as more fully discussed infra Part II.A. 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 5. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910). 
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maturing society.”6 To determine what comports with the evolving 
standards of decency, the Court considers “‘objective indicia of society’s 
standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice.’”7 As a 
result, what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment “‘necessarily 
embodies a moral judgment’” that “‘change[s] as the basic mores of society 
change.’”8 In fact, the Court has also expressly stated that its “own 
independent judgment” plays a part in the determination of whether certain 
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.9 
The evolving standards of decency test has led the Court to prohibit 
excessive sanctions,10 prohibit the death penalty for certain classes of 
crimes11 or for crimes committed by certain individuals,12 require 
punishments to be proportional to the crime,13 require individualized 
sentencing determinations,14 and prohibit a mandatory sentence of life 
without parole for juvenile homicide offenders.15  
                                                                                                                                          
 6. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 
419–20 (2008) (repeating the evolving standards of decency as the prevailing standard).  
 7. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005)). 
 8. Id. at 419 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting)). 
 9. Id. at 421. The fact that the Court admittedly interprets the Eighth Amendment 
according to its own value judgments about the validity of the punishment raises separation 
of powers concerns. When any court substitutes its own policy judgment for that of the 
legislature, it improperly usurps legislative powers. The Utah Supreme Court has explained 
that  
“As a general rule, making social policy is a job for the Legislature, not the 
courts. This is especially true when the determination or resolution requires 
placing a premium on one societal interest at the expense of another: The 
responsibility for drawing lines in a society as complex as ours—of identifying 
priorities, weighing the relevant considerations and choosing between 
competing alternatives—is the Legislature’s, not the judiciary’s.”   
Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 817 (Utah 2007) (quoting Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15, 18 
(Mich. 1999)). 
 10. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). 
 11. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (declaring it unconstitutional to execute a 
man who had raped an adult woman). 
 12. The Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional statutes that permitted execution 
of juveniles, Roper, 543 U.S. at 570–73, and those deemed “mentally retarded,” Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318, 320 (2002). 
 13. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910). 
 14. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983) (declaring that in death penalty cases, the 
Eighth Amendment requires an “individualized determination on the basis of the character 
of the individual and the circumstances of the crime”) (emphasis added). 
 15. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
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Justices Scalia and Thomas have criticized the evolving standards of 
decency standard as inconsistent with the original understanding of the 
Eighth Amendment. In particular, they reject the notion that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits certain punishment for specified classes of offenders 
or that it requires individualized sentencing in capital punishment.16 Rather, 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition was originally intended to “‘prohibit[] 
torturous methods of punishment—specifically methods akin to those that 
had been considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was 
adopted.’”17  
In short, it does not authorize courts to invalidate any 
punishment they deem disproportionate to the severity of the 
crime or to a particular class of offenders. Instead, the clause 
“leaves the unavoidably moral question of who “deserves” a 
particular nonprohibited method of punishment to the judgment 
of the legislatures that authorize the penalty.”18 
In fact, Justices Thomas and Scalia have explained that courts did not 
even begin applying the Eighth Amendment to claims concerning prison 
conditions until the 1960s, and it was not until 1976 that the Supreme Court 
first did so.19 From the founding era until the mid-1900s, “punishment” in 
the Eighth Amendment was assigned the generally understood meaning of 
“the penalty imposed for the commission of a crime.”20 In 1976, however, 
the United States Supreme Court took a different approach to the meaning 
of cruel and unusual punishments. 
B.  The Eighth Amendment As Applied to Medical Treatment of Prisoners.  
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that 
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’” prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment.21 Prison officials, therefore, must provide “humane conditions 
                                                                                                                                          
 16. Id. at 2482 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 17. Id. at 2483 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 
2044 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
 18. Id. at 2483 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2045 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting)). 
 19. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 40 (1993). 
 20. Id. at 38. 
 21. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
173 (1976)). 
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of confinement;” “ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, 
shelter, and medical care[;]” and “must ‘take reasonable measures to 
guarantee the safety of the inmates.’”22 Failure to provide this basic care is 
“incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no place in 
civilized society.”23  
Although prison officials must provide adequate medical care, not every 
failure to provide such care constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation. 
For example, an accident or even basic negligence is not sufficient.24 Rather, 
to state a claim, “‘a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently 
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is 
only such indifference that can offend “evolving standards of decency” in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.’”25 The prisoner must also show that 
the prison official acted with deliberate indifference to “a substantial risk of 
serious harm.”26 
The deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm includes 
both an objective and subjective component.27 The inmate demonstrates the 
objective component by showing that “he is incarcerated under conditions 
posing a substantial risk of serious harm.”28 If the inmate’s claim is based on 
a denial of medical care, the inmate must also demonstrate that he has a 
serious medical need for which he has not received adequate medical care.29  
A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as 
requiring treatment or “one ‘that is so obvious that even a lay person would 
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’”30 The First Circuit 
has explained that adequate services provided to treat a serious medical 
need are those “reasonably commensurate with modern medical science 
                                                                                                                                          
 22. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 
517, 526–27 (1984)). 
 23. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (concluding that the Eighth 
Amendment had been violated by the lack of medical attention afforded mentally ill prison 
inmates as a result of extensive overcrowding in California prisons).  
 24. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. 
 25. Kosilek v. Spencer, No. 00-12455-MLW, 2012 WL 3799660, at *10 (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 
2012) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102–04). 
 26. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. 
 27. Id. at 846. 
 28. Id. at 834. 
 29. Id. at 837. 
 30. Mahan v. Plymouth Cnty. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting 
Gaudreault v. Mun. of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
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and of a quality acceptable within prudent professional standards.”31 It also 
must be based on “sound medical judgment” that is determined by the 
individual prisoner’s needs.32 In analyzing the objective component of an 
Eighth Amendment medical care claim, courts point out that a prisoner 
need not receive “ideal care” or “the care of his choice.”33 Rather, prison 
officials are entitled to exercise discretion in deciding among different 
adequate treatments.  
The subjective component of the claim focuses on the prison official’s 
knowledge of the need for medical care and his deliberate indifference 
toward the serious medical need.34 “‘[T]he official must both be aware of 
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’”35 A court is 
permitted to infer an official’s state of mind from his behavior. Thus, 
deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of an inmate can be 
demonstrated by evidence of “denial, delay, or interference with prescribed 
health care.”36 Nevertheless, even if a prison official knows of the substantial 
risk of serious harm that a prisoner faces, the Eighth Amendment is not 
violated if the denial of the particular medical care is “based on reasonable, 
good faith judgments balancing the inmate’s medical needs with other 
legitimate, penological considerations.”37  
For example, in Perkins v. Kansas Department of Corrections,38 the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim 
based on the state’s failure to provide a specific prescription drug for the 
                                                                                                                                          
 31. United States v. Derbes, 369 F.3d 579, 583 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. 
DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1987)). 
 32. See Iseley v. Beard, 200 Fed. Appx. 137, 141–42 (3d Cir. 2006); Bates v. Witti, 215 
F.3d 1329 (7th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision). The sound medical judgment 
component does not, however, mean that prisoners state an Eighth Amendment claim 
simply by alleging facts giving rise to the suggestion of medical malpractice. See Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Rather, the sound medical judgment component focuses on 
whether the medical determination made by the prison officials was based on an 
individualized assessment of how to appropriately treat the prisoner. 
 33. See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, No. 00-12455-MLW, 2012 WL 3799660, at *3 (D. Mass. 
Sept. 4, 2012). 
 34. Id. at *13. 
 35. Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).  
 36. Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 453 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting DesRosiers v. Moran, 
949 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1991)). 
 37. Kosilek, 2012 WL 3799660, at *11. 
 38. Perkins v. Kansas Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 803 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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prisoner’s HIV.39 The prisoner conceded that the state provided two drugs 
to treat his HIV.40 He claimed, however, that unless he was given a third 
drug, his HIV would become immune to the first two drugs.41 The court 
found that the prisoner “simply disagrees with medical staff about the 
course of his treatment. This disagreement does not give rise to a claim 
for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”42 
In contrast, in Chance v. Armstrong,43 the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals denied the motion by prison officials to dismiss an Eighth 
Amendment claim that raised the question of whether the prison’s refusal 
to provide a certain course of treatment preferred by the inmate was based 
on sound medical judgment.44 In response to Mr. Chance’s ongoing dental 
concerns, a dentist and oral surgeon recommended that Mr. Chance have 
three teeth pulled.45 Mr. Chance asserted that less invasive and painful 
procedures would remedy his dental problems.46 Another dentist advised 
Mr. Chance that his dental problems could be resolved by pulling one tooth 
and filling another.47 In fact, yet another dentist eventually filled one of the 
teeth, resolving the problems with that tooth.48 
For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the court assumed that the dental 
problems constituted a serious medical condition sufficient to state an 
Eighth Amendment claim49 and that he had received inadequate treatment 
for that condition.50 As to deliberate indifference, the court explained that 
“mere disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a 
constitutional claim.”51 In Chance, however, the question was whether the 
decision to pull three teeth was based on sound medical judgment (and thus 
the prisoner simply disagreed with the course of treatment chosen) or based 
on a monetary incentive—namely, that the oral surgeon would be paid 
                                                                                                                                          
 39. Id. at 811. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 44. Id. at 704. 
 45. Id. at 700. 
 46. Id. at 700–701. 
 47. Id. at 701. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 702. 
 50. Id. at 703. 
 51. Id. 
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more money to pull three teeth rather than one.52 The court explained that 
if the decision was not made on sound medical judgment, it would 
constitute deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s medical needs.53 
In the context of GID prisoners asserting Eighth Amendment claims, the 
key question is whether a prison’s decision to categorically, or on a case-by-
case basis, provide psychotherapy rather than cross-gender hormones or 
sex-reassignment surgery is one that constitutes deliberate indifference to a 
serious medical need. 
II. UNDERSTANDING AND TREATING GENDER IDENTITY DISORDER 
A.  How the Medical Profession Defines Gender Identity Disorder 
Gender identity disorder is listed as a psychiatric disorder in the DSM-
IV-TR.54 The DSM is a manual published by the American Psychiatric 
Association and is used by mental health professionals as an assessment and 
diagnostic tool. It identifies mental health conditions and describes 
symptoms and other statistics concerning the mental health condition. A 
task force report of the American Psychological Association55 on Gender 
Identity and Gender Variance explained that “the diagnostic criteria for 
GID include (a) a strong or a persistent cross-gender identification, (b) 
persistent discomfort with one’s sex or a sense of inappropriateness in the 
gender role associated with one’s sex, and (c) clinically significant distress 
or impairment in functioning.”56  
The feelings of dysphoria can vary in intensity. Some patients 
are able to manage the discomfort, while others become unable 
to function without taking steps to correct the disorder. A person 
with GID often experiences severe anxiety, depression, and other 
                                                                                                                                          
 52. Id. at 703–04. 
 53. Id. at 704. 
 54. The DSM refers to the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders. It expected that the DSM-V, to be published in 2013, will no 
longer include GID as a disorder. Rather, it will be identified as gender dysphoria. American 
Psychiatric Association, Recent Updates to Proposed Revisions for DSM-5, DSM-5 
DEVELOPMENT (last visited Mar. 2, 2013), http://www.dsm5.org/Pages/RecentUpdates.aspx. 
 55. The American Psychological Association and American Psychiatric Association are 
two separate entities. 
 56. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON GENDER IDENTITY 
AND GENDER VARIANCE 31 (2009) [hereinafter 2008 GENDER IDENTITY TASK FORCE REPORT], 
available at http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/policy/gender-identity-report.pdf. 
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psychological disorders. Those with GID may attempt to commit 
suicide or to mutilate their own genitals.57  
One court has described GID as believing that a person is “‘cruelly 
imprisoned within a body incompatible with their real gender identity.’”58 
In recent years, some have referred to GID as gender dysphoria in an effort 
to destigmatize GID.59 Regardless of the label, there are differences of 
opinion concerning the proper course of treatment for those with GID or 
gender dysphoria.60  
B.  There Are Conflicting Views on the Proper Course of Treatment of GID. 
While there seems to be some variation in the appropriate treatment 
regimen of a GID-diagnosed patient based on their age, treatment 
approaches can be generally divided into two categories. One approach is to 
provide GID patients with hormones and, for some, sex-reassignment 
surgery, based on certain protocols established by the Harry Benjamin 
International Gender Dysphoria Association’s Standards of Care for Gender 
Identity Disorder.61 This approach seeks to align the patient’s biological sex 
                                                                                                                                          
 57. Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 58. Farmer v. Moritsugu, 163 F.3d 610, 611 (D.C. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting THE MERCK 
MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION 418 (1997)).  
 59. James Phillips, Gender Identity Disorder in Prison: Depending on a Diagnosis That is 
Soon to Disappear, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Sept. 23, 2012), available at 
http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/gender-disorders/content/article/10168/2105073; cf. 2008 
GENDER IDENTITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 11, 22, 26.  
 60. See 2008 GENDER IDENTITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 45. GID is distinct 
from the incredibly small number of people who have an intersex condition. Individuals with 
GID have normal genitalia. By contrast, a person with an intersex condition has genitalia 
that cannot be classified as male or female or has sex chromosomes that are inconsistent with 
the person’s physical characteristics. See Teresa Zakaria, Note, By Any Other Name: Defining 
Male and Female in Marriage Statutes, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 349, 358 (2005) (citing Leonard 
Sax, How Common is Intersex? A Response to Anne Fausto-Sterling, 39 J. Sex. Res. 174, 175 
(2002)). The intersex conditions have a prevalence of approximately 0.018%. Id. 
 61. Now in its seventh version, the Harry Benjamin standards have been adopted by the 
World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) as the appropriate 
treatment protocols. The Harry Benjamin standards are available at 
http://www.wpath.org/documents2/socv6.pdf. That the medical profession is relying on the 
work of Harry Benjamin as established protocols in this area is itself problematic. Dr. Harry 
Benjamin, an international sexologist, was a colleague of Alfred Kinsey. Among other things 
that should call into question the validity of his work, Dr. Kinsey admittedly performed 
sexual experiments on hundreds of infants and children. See JUDITH A. REISMAN, CRIMES AND 
CONSEQUENCES: THE RED QUEEN AND THE GRAND SCHEME 132–65 (2d ed. 1998). Dr. 
Benjamin wrote the introduction to a book of another Kinsey colleague, Rene Guyon. Mr. 
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with his beliefs about his gender. Another approach is to treat the 
underlying causes of GID through psychological counseling or 
psychotherapy.62 This second approach seeks to align the patient’s beliefs 
about his gender with his biological sex. The different treatment approaches 
are driven in large part by ideological differences regarding “the origins, 
meanings, and fixity/malleability of gender identity.”63  
In 1980, the American Psychiatric Association first classified GID as a 
mental disorder.64 Since the late 1970s, shortly after the American 
Psychiatric Association declassified homosexuality as a mental disorder, 
there has been a growing number of practitioners and advocacy groups who 
believe that identifying patients as having GID and treating them with the 
goal of aligning gender identity with the genetic sex is to “pathologize 
differences in gender identity or expression.”65 These practitioners maintain 
that the proper approach of treatment is to “provide care . . . that affirms 
patients’ gender identities and reduces the distress of gender dysphoria.”66  
“Affirmation,” in this context, often translates into doing whatever is 
necessary to bring external gender characteristics in line with internal belief 
of gender.67 For those who seek to affirm the patient’s gender identity when 
it conflicts with his biological sex, GID is not considered a disorder. Thus, 
patients who identify as the opposite gender of their genetic sex are to be 
encouraged to accept and embrace their inner belief. This can be 
                                                                                                                                          
Guyon was a French lawyer who coined the phrase “sex by age eight or else it’s too late.” 
Ronald D. Ray, Kinsey’s Legal Legacy, THE NEW AMERICAN, Jan. 19, 1998, at 31. In the 
introduction to Mr. Guyon’s book, entitled Sexual Ethics, Dr. Benjamin wrote that, based on 
Kinsey’s work, we needed to completely revise our legal and moral codes. “It probably comes 
as a jolt to many, even open-minded people, when they realize that chastity cannot be a 
virtue because it is not a natural state.” Id. 
 62. Paul McHugh, Surgical Sex, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 2004, at 34–38, available at 
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2009/02/surgical-sex--35. 
 63. William Byne et al., Report of the American Psychiatric Association Task Force on 
Treatment of Gender Identity Disorder, 41 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 759, 769 (2012), 
available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/65145105t4000220/?MUD=MP. 
 64. Heino F. L. Meyer-Bahlburg, From Mental Disorder to Iatrogenic Hypogonadism: 
Dilemmas in Conceptualizing Gender Identity Variants As Psychiatric Conditions, 39 
ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 461, 462 (2010), available at 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/p64152610v67k476/. 
 65. WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE 
FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 3 
(7th ver. 2012) [hereinafter WPATH Standards of Care], available at 
http://www.wpath.org/documents/SOC V7 03-17-12.pdf. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1, 3, 5. 
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accomplished by encouraging patients to live as the opposite gender role, 
undertaking a hormone regimen to either delay puberty or change their 
physical appearance to reflect their expressed gender identity, or 
undergoing sex-reassignment surgery to remove and replace sexual organs 
with those of the person’s desired gender.68  
The greater a patient’s distress over the incongruence between his 
biological sex and desired gender, the more prone the professional is to 
recommend changing that patient’s biological characteristics through 
hormones and surgery.69 The World Professional Association for 
Transgender Health (“WPATH”) is among the organizations that support a 
person’s ability to choose to undergo hormone therapy and sex-
reassignment surgery. WPATH describes itself as an international, 
professional association with a mission to promote “evidence-based care, 
education, research, advocacy, public policy, and respect for transgender 
health.”70 WPATH believes that pathologizing differences in gender identity 
expression—including even diagnosing someone with GID—demonstrates 
a lack of respect for patients.71 Instead, treatment should affirm a person’s 
choice of gender identity.72  
The WPATH Standards of Care set forth protocols for treatment.73 The 
treatment options for patients with GID include living consistent with one’s 
gender identity (which may involve cross-dressing), hormone therapy to 
feminize or masculinize the body, puberty-delaying hormones in children 
or adolescents, surgery to change sex characteristics, and psychotherapy.74 
The treatment protocols indicate that prior to surgery to change sex 
characteristics, a person should engage in a twelve-month period of taking 
hormones and living in a gender role that is consistent with his perceived 
gender identity.75 For children, the treatment protocols also provide that 
delaying hormones should be used to prevent onset of puberty and that 
children as young as sixteen could be given cross-gender hormones.76 Dr. 
                                                                                                                                          
 68. Id. at 9–10. 
 69. For example, the WPATH takes the position that “[t]reatment is available to assist 
people with such distress to explore their gender identity and find a gender role that is 
comfortable for them.” Id. at 5. 
 70. Id. at 1. 
 71. Id. at 3. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 9–10. 
 74. Id. at 9–14. 
 75. Id. at 60. 
 76. Id. at 18–20. 
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Norman Spack at the Gender Management Clinic in Boston, Massachusetts, 
reports that he has worked with a local plastic surgeon to have breast 
removal surgery performed on a female who desired to transition to being a 
male.77 Since the Clinic opened in 2007, Dr. Spack and others have worked 
with an average of nineteen children per year to assist them in changing 
their biological sex characteristics to reflect their gender identity.78 
GID stands alone, however, in treating patients in a manner that fosters 
the patient’s belief about himself when that belief does not align with 
reality.79 For example, those with a Compulsive Overeating Disorder are 
encouraged to reduce their mental dependency on food consumption,80 
while patients with Anorexia or Bulimia are encouraged to increase their 
food intake or retain their food, despite mental impulses to the contrary.81 
In other words, an anorexic is not encouraged to believe she is overweight 
and in need of losing weight; she is encouraged to attain a proper 
understanding of the role of food in her life and a healthy self-perception. 
No one would suggest that liposuction is the proper treatment protocol for 
the malnourished anorexic because she believes she is overweight. 
Body Integrity Identity Disorder (“BIID”) is probably the most 
analogous disorder to GID, and yet the course of treatments for each differs 
drastically. BIID causes a physically whole person to desire to become an 
amputee.82 As with GID, the belief is so persistent that some patients have 
attempted self-amputation of a limb.83 If the American Psychological 
Association were to approach BIID in the same way it approaches the 
treatment of GID, then it and other mental health professionals would 
                                                                                                                                          
 77. The Associated Press, Sex-Change Treatment for Kids on the Rise (Feb. 2012), 
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-204_162-57381241/sex-change-treatment-for-
kids-on-the-rise/. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See, e.g., Zakaria, supra note 60, at 349, 359 & n.47 (“GID is the only pathology for 
which ‘the patient makes the diagnosis and prescribes the treatment’”). 
 80. Denise E. Wilfley et al., A Randomized Comparison of Group Cognitive-Behavioral 
Therapy and Group Interpersonal Psychotherapy for the Treatment of Overweight Individuals 
with Binge-Eating Disorder, 59 ARCHIVES GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 713, 717–18 (Aug. 2002), 
available at http://archpsyc.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=206650. 
 81. Cynthia M. Bulik et al., Anorexia Nervosa, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EVIDENCE-BASED 
PRACTICE IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 575, 580 (Peter Sturmey & Michel Hersen eds., 2012); see 
also Zakaria, supra note 60, at 362. 
 82. Michael B. First, Desire for Amputation of a Limb: Paraphilia, Psychosis, or a New 
Type of Identity Disorder, 35 PSYCHOL. MED. 919, 926–27 (2005), available at 
http://www.biid-info.org/images/d/d8/Desire-for-amputation-of-a-limb.pdf. 
 83. Id. at 926. 
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encourage their patients to schedule appointments with surgeons to remove 
healthy limbs. Yet, given the very few instances where BIID amputations 
have been performed,84 it seems that the medical establishment does not 
believe it constitutes sound medical judgment to perform an amputation on 
a physically whole person, even if the patient desires to be an amputee.  
It seems inconsistent with other treatment modalities to foster a client’s 
version of reality that is inconsistent with actual reality, the actual reality 
being the biological facts; additionally, an effort to help the patient is also 
inconsistent when it fosters that belief with a hormone regimen or major 
surgery that fails to treat the root issues of the mental distress. Thus, there 
are other professionals who take the position that GID patients should be 
treated with psychotherapy rather than hormones and surgery.85 
Significantly, even those professionals who advocate the use of hormones or 
surgery believe that psychotherapy is an important part of treatment.86   
This other approach is justified for several reasons. First, and perhaps 
most obvious, is the perspective that gender is an immutable trait, is binary 
in nature, and coincides from birth with an individual’s sex.87 The Supreme 
Court has long held that sex is an immutable characteristic.88 At birth, the 
sex of the child is determined by genes contained in two of the forty-six 
chromosomes in human cells, referred to as the “sex chromosomes.”89 Once 
a child is born, the child’s family then develops and fosters a child’s identity, 
including gender identity, by teaching the child gender-appropriate 
behavior. GID, therefore, is properly viewed as the result of one or more 
                                                                                                                                          
 84. Id. at 919 (observing that seventeen percent of subjects had an arm or leg amputated 
with one-third obtaining the amputation through a doctor); see also Mo Costandi, The 
Science and Ethics of Voluntary Amputation, NEUROPHILOSOPHY (May 30, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/neurophilosophy/2012/may/30/1 (describing how a 
doctor’s decision to perform voluntary amputations was deemed an “inappropriate” medical 
procedure). 
 85. McHugh, supra note 62. 
 86. WPATH Standards of Care, supra note 65, at 61 (“[I]t is recommended that these 
patients also have regular visits with a mental health or other medical professional.”). 
 87. Scripture also affirms the binary nature of sex. See Genesis 1:27 (“So God created 
mankind in his own image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created 
them.”); Genesis 5:2 (“He created them male and female, and blessed them. . . .”); Mark 10:6 
(“But from the beginning of the creation, God ‘made them male and female.’”). 
 88. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 n.2 (1976) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
 89. See Zakaria, supra note 60, at 352 (citing D. PETER SNUSTAD & MICHAEL J. SIMMONS, 
PRINCIPLES OF GENETICS 126, 137 (3d ed. 2003)). 
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physiological problems, or a result of environmental factors influencing a 
person’s perception of a particular gender.90 Biologically, however, nothing 
is wrong with the person. 
Second, the psychotherapy approach that seeks to align one’s gender 
identity with biological sex avoids the medical risks associated with 
hormone use and sex-reassignment surgery, as well as the ethical risk of not 
being able to obtain informed consent from a patient with a mental 
disorder. Prolonged use of hormones to chemically change the body to 
appear more like the targeted gender have serious health risks.91 These risks 
can include, among others, an increased likelihood of cardiovascular 
disease, stroke, deep vein thrombosis, pulmonary embolism, diabetes, 
elevated liver enzymes, sleep apnea, hypertension, and the destabilization of 
psychiatric disorders in patients who are bipolar or schizoaffective.92 
Hormone treatment also can negatively impact a patient’s future ability to 
have children. As with any surgery, sex-reassignment surgery carries its 
own risks, including post-operative bleeding, hematoma, infection, 
hypertrophic scarring, and other risks associated with the attempt to alter 
genitalia.93 Both hormone treatment and sex-reassignment surgery may 
irrevocably transform the body, which has serious implications for GID 
patients who later report regret for having chosen this treatment 
approach.94 In addition, while informed consent is recognized as 
professionally necessary in order to expose a GID patient to the serious 
risks associated with hormones or surgery,95 questions arise about the 
ability to obtain informed consent for surgery to alter one’s physical 
characteristics from a person who is suffering from a mental disorder 
concerning his gender identity.  
Third, statistics demonstrate that most children, and a small number of 
adults, diagnosed with GID eventually become “comfortable with their 
                                                                                                                                          
 90. K. J. Zucker, Children with Gender Identity Disorder: Is There a Best Practice?, 56 
NEUROPSYCHIATRIE DE L’ENFANCE ET DE L’ADOLESCENCE 358, 363 (2008). 
 91. GENDER IDENTITY RESEARCH AND EDUCATION SOCIETY, A GUIDE TO HORMONE 
THERAPY FOR TRANS PEOPLE 10–12 (2007), available at http://www.gires.org.uk/assets/DOH-
Assets/pdf/doh-hormone-therapy.pdf. 
 92. Id.; see also WPATH Standards of Care, supra note 65, at 40. 
 93. CAMERON BOWMAN & JOSHUA GOLDBERG, CARE OF THE PATIENT UNDERGOING SEX 
REASSIGNMENT SURGERY (SRS) 11–14, 23–26 (2006), available at http://transhealth.vch.ca/ 
resources/library/tcpdocs/guidelines-surgery.pdf. 
 94. See Stig-Eric Olsson & Anders Möller, Regret After Sex Reassignment Surgery in a 
Male-to-Female Transsexual: A Long-Term Follow-Up, 35 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 
501, 501 (2006). 
 95. WPATH Standards of Care, supra note 65, at 24. 
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natal gender.”96 While there is little research into whether successful 
therapy is the cause for the patient eventually accepting a gender identity 
that is consistent with his biological sex,97 the phenomenon itself implies 
that GID is a mental disorder in need of psychotherapy rather than 
hormones and surgery to alter one’s physical characteristics.   
The fourth rationale for the therapy-only approach is that in the absence 
of solid medical evidence concerning the causes of and effective treatment 
modalities for GID, medical professionals should take the approach that is 
consistent with their ethical obligation to do no harm. Psychotherapy is the 
only alternative that does not harm an individual who may actually be 
mentally impaired. If GID is a disorder, the only professional way to deal 
with it is to attempt to fix the problem. Barring clear evidence that GID is 
not a mental disorder, discretion would advise that a conservative approach 
that does not increase the health risks of a patient is the responsible 
choice.98  
When the GID patient is a prisoner, the treatment options are more 
complicated. Given the debate surrounding the proper treatment of GID, a 
key question in the litigation by prisoners who have alleged deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs has been whether the prison’s chosen 
method of treatment constituted deliberate indifference. In Wisconsin, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals directed the prison officials to provide 
hormones or sex-reassignment surgery to prisoners.99 In Massachusetts, a 
federal district court held that the Eighth Amendment required the state to 
pay for a prisoner’s sex-reassignment surgery.100  
III. EXPLORING WHETHER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT REQUIRES PRISON 
OFFICIALS TO PROVIDE HORMONES OR SEX-REASSIGNMENT SURGERY TO 
PRISONERS WITH GID 
A.  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Concluded That a Complete Ban 
on Providing Hormones to Prisoners with GID Violated the Eighth 
Amendment. 
In an effort to prevent taxpayer funding of hormone therapy or sex-
reassignment surgery for prison inmates, Wisconsin passed the Inmate Sex 
                                                                                                                                          
 96. Byne et al., supra note 63, at 763. 
 97. Id. at 771–72. 
 98. Cf. McHugh, supra note 62. 
 99. Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 100. Kosilek v. Spencer, No. 00-12455-MLW, 2012 WL 3799660 (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 2012). 
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Change Prevention Act in 2005.101 Prior to the Act, the Department of 
Corrections (“DOC”) permitted prison officials to provide hormones to 
GID prisoners but would not provide sex-reassignment surgery.102All three 
plaintiffs had been receiving hormones prior to the Act’s passage.103 After 
the passage of the Act, but prior to its effective date, the DOC began 
tapering plaintiffs off their hormones in order to be in compliance with the 
Act on its effective date of January 24, 2006.104 Alleging violations of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the plaintiffs 
filed suit, requesting a preliminary injunction.105 The Eighth Amendment 
claim was premised on refusal to provide hormones and the failure to 
provide an individualized assessment of whether hormones are appropriate 
for each prisoner.106 The court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting 
the withdrawal of hormone therapy.107  
Plaintiffs Andrea Fields, Matthew Davison, and Vankemah Moaton are 
all male-to-female transsexuals who were prisoners in a Wisconsin 
correctional facility at the time of the lawsuit.108 All of the plaintiffs were 
diagnosed with GID and were provided hormones prior to passage of the 
Act.109 After the DOC began tapering plaintiffs off the hormones, the 
plaintiffs alleged that they experienced various symptoms, including nausea, 
muscle weakness, increased facial and chest hair, breast reduction, mood 
swings, and depression.110 After the district court granted a preliminary 
injunction, and when the plaintiffs began receiving cross-gender hormones 
again, their symptoms subsided.111  
Although the plaintiffs may have experienced short-term side effects as 
the state reduced and then eliminated the hormones, medical professionals 
                                                                                                                                          
 101. Id. at 552–53.  
 102. Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 850 n.5. (E.D. Wis. 2010). 
 103. Id. at 863. 
 104. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, 8, Fields v. 
Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (No. 06-C-112); Sundstrom v. Frank, 630 F. 
Supp. 2d 974, 977 (E.D. Wis. 2007). 
 105. Id.  
 106. Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 834. 
 107. Id. at 835; see also Sundstrom, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 977. The initial lawsuit included 
Kari Sundstrom and Lindsey Blackwell. They were dismissed from the lawsuit in October of 
2007 because they were released from prison. Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 834 n.1. 
 108. Id. at 835. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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actually disagree as to the long-term consequences of taking someone off 
hormones. For example, in Barnhill v. Cheery,112 the GID prisoner alleged 
that he suffered a variety of negative side effects following the prison’s 
refusal to continue his hormones.113 Dr. Do, a medical doctor with twenty-
six years of experience, testified that in that case “‘[i]t is unreasonable to 
believe that [the plaintiff] is currently suffering any physical withdrawal 
symptoms as a result of his not being prescribed female hormones’ because 
‘[t]he physical effects of exogenous estrogen or other female hormones do 
not reside in the system for years.’”114  
According to the district and circuit court decisions in Fields, the state 
did not defend the law on the grounds that hormones and sex-reassignment 
surgery were improper treatment options for GID. Rather, the state argued 
that (1) the state did not violate the Eighth Amendment when it refused to 
provide a specific form of treatment desired by the prisoner,115 and (2) it has 
legitimate safety and security concerns for passing the Act.116 Because the 
state “did not produce any evidence that another treatment could be an 
adequate replacement for hormone therapy,”117 the state doomed its 
argument that the court should defer to the state’s decision not to provide 
hormones or sex-reassignment surgery.     
With respect to the alleged security concern, the plaintiffs in Fields 
argued that the Act did not advance the state’s interests in prison safety.118 
Generally, prison administrators are given “‘wide-ranging deference in the 
adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are 
needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain 
institutional security.’”119 That deference is afforded unless the actions are 
“‘taken in bad faith and for no legitimate purpose.’”120 The primary security 
concern that relates to GID prisoners is the problems caused as a result of 
sexual activity among inmates, which can result in volatile and dangerous 
conditions.121  
                                                                                                                                          
 112. Barnhill v. Cheery, No. 8:06-CV-922-T-23TGW, 2008 WL 759322 (M.D. Fla. March 
20, 2008). 
 113. Id. at *2. 
 114. Id. at *3.  
 115. Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 554–55 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. at 556.  
 118. Id. at 557. 
 119. Id. at 557–58 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1986)). 
 120. Id. at 558 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322). 
 121. Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 868 (E.D. Wis. 2010). 
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In Fields, the state’s security expert testified that the more feminine a 
male prisoner becomes the more likely it becomes that he will be a victim of 
sexual assault by fellow prisoners.122 The same expert, however, also 
testified that a prison he worked for in another state was able to manage 
security concerns raised by men who were receiving feminizing 
hormones.123 In concluding that the state’s security concerns were 
insufficient to overcome the plaintiffs’ claims, the district court found that, 
although one of the plaintiffs had been sexually assaulted while receiving 
hormones in prison, there was nothing in the record to indicate he would 
not have otherwise been the victim of sexual assault.124 The Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s conclusion as to the security concern.125 By 
order dated August 5, 2011, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
grant of a permanent injunction preventing implementation of the Act.126 
Specifically, the district court restrained the state and prison officials from 
enforcing or attempting to enforce the provisions of the Act that place a 
complete ban on the provision of cross-gender hormones.127    
B. A Federal Judge in Massachusetts Is the First to Order a State to Pay for a 
Prisoner with GID to Receive a Sex-Reassignment Surgery.128 
Robert Kosilek, who prefers to be called Michelle, is a male-to-female 
transsexual prisoner housed in a state prison in Massachusetts.129 He 
                                                                                                                                          
 122. Fields, 653 F.3d at 557. The National Center for Lesbian Rights understands the 
increased safety risk, stating that housing inmates who have not had sex-reassignment 
surgery, based on their birth sex regardless of how they have lived or how much treatment 
they have undergone puts male to female transsexuals at great risk of sexual violence.  Rights 
of Transgendered Prisoners, NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS 1 (June 2006), available 
at http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/RightsofTransgenderPrisoners.pdf?docID=6381. 
Some propose that prisons should place men who are taking feminizing hormones in the 
female prison population. E.g., Darren Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing: Transgendered 
Prisoners Caught in the Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 531 (2000). 
 123. Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 868. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Fields, 653 F.3d at 558. Plaintiffs separately claimed in Fields that the state’s 
categorical ban on providing hormones or sex-reassignment surgery violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 867. Although 
the district court held that the Act violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the Seventh Circuit 
declined to reach the issue. Fields, 653 F.3d at 559.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 869. 
 128. Kosilek v. Spencer, No. 00-12455-MLW, 2012 WL 3799660 (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 2012). 
 129. Id. at *1.  
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brought suit, asking that the state be required to pay for his transition from 
male to female.130 After more than a decade of litigation and at least five 
publicly available opinions by the district and circuit court of appeals, on 
September 4, 2012, a federal district judge in Massachusetts became the first 
judge in the nation to order a prison to provide a sex-reassignment surgery 
for one of its prisoners.131   
Kosilek was convicted in 1992 of murdering his wife and sentenced to life 
in prison without parole.132 Prior to meeting his wife, Kosilek had taken 
female hormones, which had made him feel “normal” for the first time in 
his life.133 The trial testimony revealed that Kosilek regularly was abused by 
his grandfather and, when Kosilek announced his desire to live as a girl, was 
stabbed by his stepfather.134 Kosilek eventually obtained female hormones 
from a doctor in exchange for sex.135  
While in a drug rehabilitation facility, Kosilek met his wife, Cheryl 
McCaul, who was a volunteer at the facility.136 McCaul convinced Kosilek 
that his transsexualism “would be cured by ‘a good woman.’”137 
Unfortunately, during his marriage his distress over gender identity 
continued.138 In 1990, after McCaul became angry when she discovered 
Kosilek wearing McCaul’s clothing, Kosilek murdered her.139 While 
awaiting trial for murder, he began taking female hormones in the form of 
birth control pills that a guard illegally provided to Kosilek.140 Prior to his 
trial, the county sheriff denied Kosilek any treatment for his gender identity 
disorder.141 Kosilek then twice attempted suicide and once attempted to 
                                                                                                                                          
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at *53; see also Pauline Kim, Massachusetts Judge Rules for Inmate’s Sex-Change 
Surgery, CNN HEALTH (Sep. 6, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/04/health/ 
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 132. Kosilek, 2012 WL 3799660, at *1. 
 133. Kosilek v. Malone, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 163–64 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 134. Id. at 163. 
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 136. Id. at 164. 
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castrate himself.142 After his conviction, Kosilek began “living like a 
woman,” and changed his name to Michelle.143  
While Kosilek was in prison, doctors under contract with the DOC 
diagnosed Kosilek with GID and prescribed hormones and, possibly, sex-
reassignment surgery.144 At that time, the DOC’s policy presumptively 
permitted prisoners to obtain hormones if the prisoner had been prescribed 
hormones prior to entering the prison facility, but it only allowed an 
increase or decrease in treatment if it was determined to be medically 
necessary and approved by both the Director of the Department of Health 
Services Division and the Commissioner.145 GID was the only medical 
condition that required DOC doctors to obtain the Commissioner’s 
approval to provide treatment that doctors found to be medically 
necessary.146 After the DOC failed to provide Kosilek with the prescribed 
hormones, because he had not been receiving them prior to incarceration, 
he filed suit asserting an Eighth Amendment claim.147 
In 2002, the federal district court concluded that Kosilek had a serious 
medical need and had been denied adequate medical care.148 The court, 
however, did not order the DOC to provide hormones.149 Instead, the court 
issued an opinion explaining that Kosilek must be provided hormones 
unless the DOC concludes, in good faith, that it could not discharge its duty 
to protect the safety of its inmates.150 The court specifically cautioned the 
DOC that it would constitute an Eighth Amendment violation if the 
hormones, and possibly sex-reassignment surgery, were denied as a result of 
costs or potential public controversy.151 After the decision, doctors engaged 
a GID specialist to evaluate Kosilek.152  
Pursuant to the Harry Benjamin Standards of Care, the doctor 
recommended that Kosilek be provided estrogen therapy, electrolysis to 
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remove facial hair, and access to female clothing and makeup.153 The doctor 
specifically mentioned that after a year of treatment with hormones and 
living as a female, Kosilek should be assessed for the possibility of sex-
reassignment surgery.154  
The DOC asked the superintendent of the prison where Kosilek was 
housed to prepare a written report as to whether it would create any 
security risks to provide hormones to Kosilek.155 Specifically, the DOC was 
concerned that a security risk existed in light of the large population of sex 
offenders in the prison system.156 The superintendent’s report concluded 
that providing hormones would not present a security risk but that the risk 
would need to be reevaluated once Kosilek began to experience physical 
changes from the hormone treatment.157  
In August 2003, Kosilek began taking estrogen hormones and, in 
October 2003, he began wearing female undergarments.158 In December 
2003, a new Commissioner, Ms. Dennehy, took office.159 Dennehy had 
played an integral role as part of the DOC’s prior efforts to prevent Kosilek 
from receiving hormones for his GID.160 Before she would consider 
approving laser hair removal or any additional steps toward sex-
reassignment surgery, Dennehy ordered a reevaluation of Kosilek.161  
In September 2004, Kosilek had been taking hormones for a year and was 
due for an evaluation for possible sex-reassignment surgery.162 Rather than 
use doctors identified by the University of Massachusetts Correctional 
Health Program, which was under contract with the DOC to provide 
medical services to prison inmates, Dennehy commissioned another expert 
to evaluate Kosilek.163 Dennehy selected an individual who was working 
with two other states that also did not believe sex-reassignment surgery 
should be provided to prisoners with GID.164  
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In the meantime, the doctors retained from University of Massachusetts 
issued their report.165 The doctors concluded that Kosilek had demonstrated 
an ability to live as a female in a male prison while taking the prescribed 
hormones.166 Nevertheless, Kosilek “continued to be ‘quite distressed’ about 
his male anatomy.”167 They opined that “‘given her previous suicide 
attempts, her ongoing distress, and the lack of other goals in her life, it is 
quite likely that [Kosilek] will attempt suicide again if she is not able to 
change her anatomy.’”168 The doctors recommended that Kosilek have sex-
reassignment surgery.169 The court opinion makes clear that DOC officials 
did not believe that the Department should be required to pay for an 
inmate’s sex-reassignment surgery and that they did not want to be the first 
in the nation to pay for sex-reassignment surgery for a prisoner.170  
The key legal question in Kosilek was whether the failure to provide sex-
reassignment surgery violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment.171 The district court heard conflicting 
testimony about the proper course of treatment for GID.172 The position in 
support of treating GID with hormones and sex-reassignment surgery was 
based primarily on the Standards of Care established by Harry Benjamin 
and adopted by WPATH.173 As discussed previously, those standards 
establish a triadic sequence of hormones, real-life experience living as a 
member of the opposite-sex, and sex-reassignment surgery.174 The 
Standards of Care are based on the premise that sex-reassignment surgery 
“is not ‘experimental, investigational, elective, cosmetic,’ or optional in any 
meaningful sense.”175 
The state offered expert testimony from Dr. Schmidt, who believed that 
the proper course of treatment for GID is psychotherapy and 
antidepressants.176 Describing Dr. Schmidt as an imprudent professional, 
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the court rejected his testimony, concluding that Dr. Schmidt’s approach is 
not “aimed at curing the mental illness,” but rather is designed to simply 
“manag[e] the symptoms of that illness to reduce the intensity of the 
suffering and the risk of suicide.”177 In other words, the court accepted the 
viewpoint that providing hormones and sex-reassignment surgery to align 
one’s biological sex with one’s perception of reality is aimed at “curing” the 
patient, whereas providing psychotherapy in an attempt to discover root 
causes to the intense desire to live inconsistently with one’s biological sex is 
unprofessional conduct. The district court ordered the DOC to provide sex-
reassignment surgery.178 
C.  A Federal District Court Upholds a Policy That Prohibits Hormones 
Except in a Limited Set of Circumstances.179 
Texas adopted yet another approach to treatment of GID prisoners. A 
health care policy for the correctional system in Texas prohibits prison 
officials from providing hormones to transsexual patients unless the 
prisoner meets specific, limited criteria. The prisoner must (1) have a 
confirmed parole or discharge date of no more than 180 days from the date 
that the prisoner requests hormones, (2) demonstrate that he will receive 
sex-reassignment surgery immediately upon discharge, and (3) provide 
letters from a “free world physician and psychiatrist/psychologist” stating 
that the prisoner has been on hormone therapy and intends to have sex-
reassignment surgery.180 Those who do not satisfy the conditions, however, 
are still eligible to receive mental health treatment.181  
After the prison refused to provide plaintiff, Allen Young, with 
feminizing hormones, he brought suit alleging an Eighth Amendment 
violation. The medical professionals in the prison concluded that Mr. 
Young suffered from GID but that he did not satisfy the criteria to receive 
hormones. In particular, the plaintiff did not have a confirmed release date 
within 180 days and did not provide a physician’s letter stating that he had 
been taking hormones and planned to have sex-reassignment surgery 
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 178. Id. at *53. The court did not order DOC to transfer Kosilek to a female facility after 
the surgery. Instead, the court explained that the DOC “has the discretion to make good 
faith, reasonable decisions concerning security if the surgery genuinely creates or increases 
any risk to Kosilek or others.” Id. at *54. 
 179. Young v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch Corr. Health Care, No. 6:11CV363, 2012 WL 
262983 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2012), aff’d, 2012 WL 262617 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2012). 
 180. Id. at *9. 
 181. Id. at *15. 
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immediately upon discharge.182 In lieu of hormones, Mr. Young was 
referred for mental health counseling.183 
The court reviewed prior case law from the circuit courts, finding that 
“[n]ot a single decision, however, mandates hormone therapy. The manner 
of treatment is within the discretion of the prison.”184 Because Kosilek had 
not yet been decided, the court did not factor that case into its decision. The 
court concluded that the defendants had not been deliberately indifferent to 
Mr. Young’s medical needs and that the policy was reasonable and 
supported by legitimate penological interests.185 Thus, the court upheld a 
policy that prohibited prison officials from providing cross-gender 
hormones except in a very limited set of circumstances. 
D.  A Federal District Court in Virginia Upholds a Decision Not to Provide 
Sex-Reassignment Surgery.186  
A federal district court in Virginia upheld Virginia’s decision not to 
provide sex-reassignment surgery. In De’Lonta, Michael Stokes brought an 
Eighth Amendment claim against the Virginia Department of Corrections 
(“VDOC”) for its refusal to provide Stokes with sex-reassignment 
surgery.187 Stokes was diagnosed with GID and identified as a pre-operative 
transsexual female.188 VDOC had provided him with hormones for four 
years before this current lawsuit was filed.189 While he was in prison, the 
VDOC implemented a policy prohibiting prison officials from providing 
hormones or sex-reassignment surgery to its prisoners.190 Stokes challenged 
that policy in court, which resulted in a settlement between the parties to 
provide Stokes cross-gender hormones.   
                                                                                                                                          
 182. Id. at *9. 
 183. Id. at *15. 
 184. Id. at *14. 
 185. Id. at *15. 
 186. De’Lonta v. Johnson, No. 7:11-CV-00257, 2011 WL 5157262 (W.D. Va. Oct. 28, 
2011), rev’d, 2013 WL 310350 (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 2013) (concluding that De’Lonta had stated a 
claim for relief but refusing to suggest whether he would succeed on the merits or be entitled 
to any particular remedy). 
 187. De’Lonta, 2011 WL 5157262, at *1. He separately alleged that it constituted a 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violation to deny his request to be housed in the 
female facility. Id. at *3. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at *2. 
 190. Id. at *3. 
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Prior to Stokes’s second lawsuit, Stokes had lived as a female in the male 
correctional facility for more than a year by dressing and living as a 
woman.191 Stokes, however, alleged that because VDOC would not provide 
sex-reassignment surgery, the distress from the GID made him want to 
castrate himself.192 He claimed that Virginia’s refusal to provide sex-
reassignment surgery constituted a denial of adequate medical care and 
placed him at a substantial risk of serious medical harm.193  
The district court dismissed the Eighth Amendment claim because Mr. 
Stokes had received medical care, albeit not the sex-reassignment surgery he 
desired. Citing a Seventh Circuit decision, the court explained that “‘[a] 
prison is not required by the Eighth Amendment to give a prisoner medical 
care that is as good as he would receive if he were a free person, let alone an 
affluent free person. He is entitled only to minimum care. . . . Withholding 
from a prisoner an esoteric medical treatment that only the wealthy can 
afford does not strike us as a form of cruel and unusual punishment.’”194 
The court held that VDOC was not deliberately indifferent to Mr. Stokes’ 
medical needs. Rather, he had received treatment and his “dissatisfaction 
with the progress or choice of treatment” did not state an Eighth 
Amendment claim.195 
As the various court decisions highlight, there is no consensus as to the 
proper course of treatment for GID or, more particularly, whether a state’s 
decision to pursue one course of treatment over another constitutes an 
Eighth Amendment violation.  
                                                                                                                                          
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. at *5 (quoting Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997)). The Seventh 
Circuit in Fields disagreed with its prior decision in Maggert, stating that the cost of 
hormones and sex-reassignment surgery had declined since the late 1990s when Maggert was 
decided. Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 555–56 (7th Cir. 2011). The court in Fields explained 
that hormones cost between $300–$1,000 per inmate, per year, and that sex-reassignment 
surgery could be performed for approximately $20,000. Id. at 555. The court pointed out that 
surgeries for coronary bypass or kidney transplant were more expensive, and yet, the 
department of corrections had paid for those surgeries. Id. at 555–56. Comparing the cost of 
cross-gender hormones and sex-reassignment surgery to that of a heart bypass begs the 
underlying question of the proper course of treatment for GID. If it is considered a mental 
disorder that can be effectively treated through psychotherapy, then it is not comparable to 
heart bypass or kidney transplant. 
 195. De’Lonta, 2011 WL 5157262, at *6. 
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IV. HAVING TAKEN SIDES IN AN ONGOING POLICY, IDEOLOGICAL, AND 
MEDICAL CONTROVERSY, THE COURTS HAVE IMPROPERLY INTERFERED 
WITH THE DISCRETION OF PRISON OFFICIALS TO CHOOSE AMONG 
TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES FOR GID PRISONERS. 
The courts that have ordered states to provide hormone or sex-
reassignment surgery have taken sides in an ongoing cultural controversy 
and, as a result, have crossed the line from neutral arbiter of the law to 
policy maker.196 In a 1992 article, Dr. Paul McHugh explained that he 
cautions his psychiatry students at The Johns Hopkins University School of 
Medicine about “the power of cultural fashion to lead psychiatric thought 
and practice off in false, eve[n] disastrous, directions.”197 He maintains that 
one of those missteps concerns the medical profession’s response to the 
demand by GID patients for sex-reassignment surgery. 
Dr. McHugh’s statements are particularly relevant given that Johns 
Hopkins was one of the first hospitals to perform sex-reassignment 
surgery.198 When Dr. McHugh became director at Johns Hopkins School of 
Medicine in 1975, he made it a priority to no longer perform the 
surgeries.199 After studying patients with GID who had sought or received 
sex-reassignment surgery, the decision was made to no longer perform 
these surgeries.200 Through his research, Dr. McHugh found that sex-
                                                                                                                                          
 196. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Lawrence, 
Justice Scalia states that the Court’s opinion to overrule prior precedent and declare 
unconstitutional Texas’s anti-sodomy law “is the product of a Court, which is the product of 
a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by 
which I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the 
moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.” Id.  
 197. Paul R. McHugh, Psychiatric Misadventures, THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR 497–510, at 
Part III (Autumn 1992), available at http://www.lhup.edu/~dsimanek/mchugh.htm. 
Although Dr. McHugh does not address it as another psychiatric misstep, the 
declassification of homosexuality as a mental disorder in order to appease various social and 
advocacy groups, has led to alarming consequences. For example, in September 2012, 
California passed a law that prohibits licensed mental health professionals from providing 
any counseling to a minor for the purpose of discouraging a person’s chosen sexual 
orientation. Pursuant to the California law, the counseling has been deemed harmful and, 
therefore, parents have been stripped of the right to consent to medical treatment on behalf 
of their children.  See S.B. 1172, 2012 Leg., 2011–2012 Sess. (Cal. 2012) (to be codified at CAL. 
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865). 
 198. See McHugh, supra note 62.  
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. He concluded his article by stating that the medical profession had “wasted 
scientific and technical resources and damaged our professional credibility by collaborating 
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reassignment surgery had not cured the patients because it had not treated 
the underlying causes that had manifested themselves as GID.201 Similarly, 
many other hospitals stopped performing the surgeries.202  
The American Psychological Association has admitted that the American 
Psychiatric Association declassified homosexuality as a mental disorder 
based on emerging, not established, science and the public pressure to help 
alleviate discrimination based on sexual orientation; Dr. McHugh points 
out that those who advocated for sex-reassignment surgery were similarly 
swept away by prevailing cultural fashion.203  
The zeal for this sex-change surgery—perhaps, with the 
exception of frontal lobotomy, the most radical therapy ever 
encouraged by twentieth century psychiatrists—did not derive 
from critical reasoning or thoughtful assessments. These were so 
faulty that no one holds them up anymore as standards for 
launching any therapeutic exercise, let alone one so irretrievable 
as a sex-change operation. The energy came from the fashions of 
the seventies that invaded the clinic—if you can do it and he 
wants it, why not do it? It was all tied up with the spirit of doing 
your thing, following your bliss, an aesthetic that sees diversity as 
everything and can accept any idea, including that of permanent 
                                                                                                                                          
with madness [of changing one’s sex through surgery in order to discover one’s true identity] 
rather than trying to study, cure, and ultimately prevent it.” Id. 
 201. Id. Even the APA Task Force on Gender Identity and Gender Variance pointed out 
that “[c]oexisting psychiatric conditions occur frequently among children referred for 
clinical evaluation.” 2008 GENDER IDENTITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 47. In 
other words, there are underlying problems manifesting themselves in a variety of ways, 
including as GID. The APA, however, did not acknowledge that GID is the manifestation of 
issues that need resolving. Rather, the APA takes the position that GID itself can be cured by 
changing one’s sex characteristics. Id. at 32. 
 202. See McHugh, supra note 62. Dr. McHugh’s conclusions are bolstered by a study 
published in 2011 that followed postoperative transsexuals in Sweden and found many had 
continued health and psychological issues even after surgery, including higher rates of 
suicide. See Travis Wright Colopy, Setting Gender Identity Free: Expanding Treatment for 
Transsexual Inmates, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 227, 266 (2012) (discussing study by Cecilia Dhejne 
et al., Long-Term Follow-Up of Transsexual Persons Undergoing Sex Reassignment Surgery: 
Cohort Study in Sweden, PLOS ONE (Feb. 2011), http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/ 
10.1371/journal.pone.0016885); see also Travis Cox, Medically Necessary Treatments for 
Transgender Prisoners and the Misguided Law in Wisconsin, 24 WISC. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 
341, 365 (2009) (discussing dissatisfaction of post-operative patients). 
 203. McHugh, supra note 197, at Part III. 
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sex change, as interesting and that views resistance to such ideas 
as uptight if not oppressive.204 
Rather than performing surgery to remove or alter body parts, Dr. McHugh 
believes that the licensed mental health professionals must “learn how to 
manage this condition as a mental disorder when we fail to prevent it.”205 
For those physicians who recommend sex-reassignment surgery, he stated 
that they have “abandon[ed] the role of protecting patients from their 
symptoms and become little more than technicians working on behalf of a 
cultural force.”206 
Outside the context of Eighth Amendment prisoner cases, the courts are 
also divided on whether a person’s sex is determined at birth or whether it 
can be changed by surgery. A 1976 decision by a New Jersey intermediate 
appellate court concluded that a man who had undergone a male-to-female 
sex-reassignment surgery should be treated as a woman for purposes of a 
marriage license.207 As a result of the court decision, M.T., who had been 
born a male, was deemed a female and, therefore, permitted to marry a 
man.  
Conversely, a Texas Court of Appeals in 1999 rejected the M.T. 
reasoning, concluding that biology determined one’s sex.208 After pointing 
out its belief that the legislature could determine whether someone who 
undergoes a sex change surgery should be legally treated as having changed 
his sex, the court held that because “male chromosomes do not change with 
either hormonal treatment or sex reassignment surgery. . . . [A] post-
operative female transsexual is still a male.”209 In reaching its decision, the 
Littleton court pointed out that an Ohio court had reached a similar 
decision in 1987 in determining for probate purposes that a male who 
became a post-operative female was not validly married to another male.210  
Adopting the reasoning of Littleton, in 2004, a Florida Court of Appeals 
declared a marriage void that had been entered into between a biological 
female and a biological female who had undergone a female-to-male sex 
                                                                                                                                          
 204. Id. 
 205. Id.  
 206. Id. 
 207. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 210–11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) 
 208. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999). 
 209. Id. at 230. 
 210. Id. at 228 (citing In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987) (“[A] 
person’s sex is determined at birth by an anatomical examination by the birth attendant.”)). 
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reassignment.211 In the context of a custody dispute, the wife and birth 
mother claimed the marriage was void. The court of appeals agreed with 
her, concluding that sex is determined at birth and, therefore, the marriage 
between two women was void.212 
The idea that people can change their sex has led to some strange 
circumstances, including the headline Thomas Beatie, The ‘Pregnant Man,’ 
Wants A Fourth Child.213 Thomas Beatie was born female, underwent 
partial sex-reassignment surgery, married a woman, and eventually became 
pregnant. While Beatie was pregnant with her fourth child, she was 
attempting to divorce her wife.214 The Arizona court hearing the divorce 
matter questioned whether Arizona could divorce the couple—Arizona 
prohibits same-sex marriage.215   
The lack of clarity in the psychiatric and legal community about the 
immutability of gender, whether GID should be classified as a mental 
disorder, and, more importantly, what is the appropriate course of 
treatment for GID, prompted the Psychiatric Times to publish an article 
immediately after the Kosilek decision was issued. The article criticized the 
Kosilek decision as “foolishness” based on “psychiatric experts, who may 
again have led psychiatry down the slippery slope of diagnostic 
overreaching.”216 Dr. Phillips highlighted the fact that there is ongoing 
controversy surrounding the proper diagnosis, label, and treatment of 
GID.217 He explained that the DSM-5 workgroups, who have been working 
on changes to the DSM-IV, have been criticized for their decision to change 
Gender Identity Disorder to Gender Dysphoria in an alleged effort to 
remove social stigma attached to those with GID.218 He characterized the 
current understanding about GID as one of “bewilderment over how to 
treat” it, highlighting that “as with other value-laden diagnoses, there is no 
                                                                                                                                          
 211. Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 212. Id.  
 213. Thomas Beatie, The ‘Pregnant Man,’ Wants Fourth Child, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 
4, 2012, 5:19 PM), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/04/thomas-beatie-
pregnant-man-fourth-child_n_1855318.html.  
 214. Id. 
 215. Id.; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXX. 
 216. James Phillips, Gender Identity Disorder in Prison: Depending on a Diagnosis that is 
Soon to Disappear?, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/ 
genderdisorders/content/article/10168/2105073. Dr. Phillips is an associate clinical professor 
of psychiatry at the Yale School of Medicine.  
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
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scientific way to decide whether GID or Gender Dysphoria is or is not a 
psychiatric illness.”219 
It is precisely the lack of clarity about GID, including its proper course of 
treatment, that should lead courts to affirm a state’s decision not to provide 
hormone therapy or sex-reassignment surgery. Given that a prisoner does 
not state an Eighth Amendment claim by alleging that the prison failed to 
provide the treatment the prisoner prefers,220 prisoners should not be able 
to demand injunctive relief requiring states to provide hormones or sex-
reassignment surgery. A state’s decision to treat GID prisoners with 
psychotherapy does not constitute a failure to treat with adequate medical 
care. As Dr. Phillips pointed out, the decision not to provide hormones or 
sex-reassignment surgery may be a failure to treat in a manner that is 
consistent with current politically driven agendas, but it is not failure to 
adhere to sound, professional medical judgment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As with the American Psychiatric Association’s 1973 decision to 
declassify homosexuality as a mental disorder, the recent push to declassify 
GID as a mental disorder has its roots in an ideologically driven agenda. In 
a 2009 task force report on Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual 
Orientation, the American Psychological Association reported that the 
decision to declassify homosexuality as a mental disorder in the DSM was 
based on “emerging scientific evidence and encouraged by the social 
movement for ending sexual orientation discrimination . . . .”221 In other 
words, the science did not then (or now) support the notion that 
                                                                                                                                          
219219. Id. Dr. Phillips also questioned the expert testimony offered in favor of Mr. Kosilek. 
“We can wonder, after psychiatry’s disastrous experiences with homosexuality and the 
violent sexual predator statutes, why the plaintiff psychiatrists [Dr. Appelbaum and his 
colleagues] would allow themselves to be sucked into this morass of another dubious, value-
driven, sex-related diagnosis? Does psychiatry need to look foolish one more time for its 
diagnostic overreaching?” Id.  
 220. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 
240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); Lane v. Vinzant, 657 F.2d 468, 473 (1st Cir. 1981); Randall v. 
Wyrick, 642 F.2d 304, 308 (8th Cir. 1981). Judge Posner, in Maggert v. Hanks, has also 
pointed out that “[w]ithholding from a prisoner an esoteric medical treatment that only the 
wealthy can afford does not strike us as a form of cruel and unusual punishment.” Maggert v. 
Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1997).   
 221. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION 
TASK FORCE ON APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION 11 (2009), 
available at http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/therapeutic-response.pdf. 
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“homosexuality per se is not a mental disorder,”222 but political ideologies 
drove the medical determination.  
Similarly, the American Psychological Association’s report on gender 
identity and gender variance admits that there is not “sufficient research 
concerning many transgender issues to develop empirically based 
guidelines related to all important areas of practice . . . .”223 Nevertheless, the 
APA adopts the view that one’s gender identity should be affirmed, even if 
it is not congruent with one’s biological sex, because of discrimination and 
stereotyping that is alleged to exist.224 The ideologically driven agenda is 
demonstrated by the resolutions contained in the APA’s report on gender 
identity, where the organization states that mental health professionals 
“take a leadership role in working against discrimination toward 
transgender and gender-variant individuals,” including support for “civil 
marriage and all its attendant benefits, rights, privileges and responsibilities, 
regardless of gender identity or expression.”225 Encouraging a particular 
course of treatment to assist the movement for civil marriage between any 
two persons, regardless of gender, is what Dr. McHugh refers to as 
“technicians working on behalf of a cultural force.”226 
Hijacked by the same ideologically driven agenda, courts have expanded 
the Eighth Amendment beyond its intended scope to require states to 
provide hormones and even sex-reassignment surgery to prisoners who 
suffer such distress from the realities of their physical characteristics that 
they self-mutilate and attempt suicide. Common sense dictates that the 
proper course of treatment is to identify the underlying causes of the mental 
distress and treat those issues—not to humor the patient’s false sense of 
gender identity. Doctors do not humor the deathly malnourished anorexic 
who believes her mental distress will improve if she could simply lose more 
weight or the healthy individual whose strong desire to be an amputee leads 
to self-amputation; why, then, do treatment protocols exist that call for 
mental health professionals to alter an otherwise healthy body in order to 
align the existing characteristics with one’s perception of gender?  
Playing God, courts are acting on the presumption that we are not all 
created male and female, but that we are created male, female, male who 
should be female, and female who should be male. As a result, courts have 
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begun to mandate that states pay for hormones and surgeries that indulge a 
prisoner’s improper self-image. In the process, courts are taking sides in a 
public policy debate over the immutability of sex, gender, and gender 
identity. Not only are courts exceeding their authority in making such 
policy decisions, but they are complicit in requiring doctors to violate their 
obligation to “do no harm” when they order prisons to provide cross-
gender hormones or sex-reassignment surgery.  
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